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Fire sales are forced sales of assets in which high-valuation bidders are sidelined, typically due to debt
overhang problems afflicting many specialist bidders simultaneously.  We overview theoretical and
empirical research on asset fire sales, which shows how they can arise, how they can lead to asset
under-valuations, how contracts and bankruptcy regimes adjust to the risk of fire sales, how fire sales
can lead to downward spirals or cascades in asset prices, how arbitrage fails in the presence of fire
sales, and how fire sales can reduce productive investment.  We conclude by showing how asset fire
sales shed light on several aspects of the recent financial crisis, and can account for the success of
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Analysts of the recent financial crisis often refer to the role of asset “fire sales” in 
depleting the balance sheets of financial institutions and aggravating the fragility of the 
financial system.  For example, a report from the U.S. Treasury (2009) held: “An initial 
fundamental shock associated with the bursting of the housing bubble and deteriorating 
economic conditions generated losses for leveraged investors including banks. . . . The 
resulting need to reduce risk triggered a wide-scale deleveraging in these markets and led 
to fire sales.”   Similarly, a discussion of the crisis by leading American financial 
economists (French et al., 2010, p. 67) argued: “A bank that simply suffers large losses 
may be forced to reduce its risk by selling assets at distressed or fire-sale prices.  If other 
banks must revalue their assets at these temporarily low market values, the first sale can 
set off a cascade of fire sales that inflicts losses on many institutions.  Thus, whether 
through defaults or fire sales, one troubled bank can damage many others, reducing the 
financial system’s capacity to bear risk and make loans.”  Economists at the Federal 
Reserve (Carlson, Haubrick, Cherney, and Wakefield, 2009), in explaining the Fed policy 
of guaranteeing money market funds during the crisis, write: “The effect of the 
announcement was to permit an orderly management of withdrawals from the money 
funds, preventing a liquidation of assets at distressed prices, which could have 
destabilized the funds’ net asset values.”  
The current crisis is not the first where terminology of a “fire sale” has been used. 
In 1998 testimony to Congress following the collapse and rescue of the Long-Term 
Capital Management hedge fund, Fed Chairman Greenspan testified (as quoted in 
Caballero and Simsek, 2010): “Quickly unwinding a complicated portfolio that contains 
exposure to all manner of risks, such as that of LTCM, in such market conditions 3 
 
amounts to conducting a fire sale. The prices received in a time of stress do not reflect 
longer run potential, adding to the losses incurred.”    
The term “fire sale” has been around since the nineteenth century to describe 
firms selling smoke-damaged merchandise at cut-rate prices in the aftermath of a fire.  
But what are fire sales in broad financial markets with hundreds of participants?  How 
can fire sales matter for generic goods, such as airplanes or financial securities?  In 
modern financial research, the term “fire sale” has acquired a different meaning.  As we 
suggested in a 1992 paper, a fire sale is essentially a forced sale of an asset at a dislocated 
price.  The asset sale is forced in the sense that the seller cannot pay creditors without 
selling assets.  The price is dislocated because the highest potential bidders are typically 
involved in a similar activity as the seller, and are therefore themselves indebted and 
cannot borrow more to buy the asset.  Indeed, rather than bidding for the asset, they 
might be selling similar assets themselves.  Assets are then bought by nonspecialists who, 
knowing that they have less expertise with the assets in question, are only willing to buy 
at valuations that are much lower.   
Assets sold in fire sales can trade at prices far below value in best use, causing 
severe losses to sellers.  Of course, borrowers and lenders can seek to negotiate and 
renegotiate contracts to avoid fire sales, but sometimes they fail.  Fire sales and efforts to 
avoid them shed light on a range of empirical phenomena, such as the structure of debt 
contracts, organization of bankruptcy regimes, and even the failures of arbitrage and 
market efficiency in financial markets.   Fire sales can also lead to fragility of financial 
markets during crises.  When a fire sale leads to a sharp reduction in an asset’s price, 
similar assets held by other market participants decline in value as well, which might 4 
 
bring them also to financial distress and forced asset sales.   This self-reinforcing process 
can lead to downward spirals or cascades in asset prices and net worth of market 
participants.   Because of fire sales, risk becomes systemic. Through this process, asset 
fire sales and the deterioration of the net worth of firms and financial institutions can 
severely undermine financial intermediation, leading to reductions of real investment and 
output.   
In this paper, we selectively review some of the research on fire sales, 
emphasizing both concepts and supporting evidence.  We begin by describing our 1992 
model of fire sales and the related findings in empirical corporate finance.  We then show 
that models of fire sales can account for several related phenomena during the recent 
financial crisis, including the contraction of the banking system and the failures of 
arbitrage in financial markets exemplified by historically unprecedented differences in 
prices of very similar securities.  We then link fire sales to macroeconomics by 
discussing how such dislocations of security prices and the reduction in balance sheets of 
banks can reduce investment and output.  Finally, we consider how the concept of fire 
sales can help us think about government interventions in financial markets, including the 
evidently successful Federal Reserve interventions in 2009.  Fire sales are surely not the 
whole story of the financial crisis, but they are a phenomenon that binds together many 
elements of the crisis.   
 
Modeling Fire Sales  
A fire sale of an asset is a forced sale, which can occur for a number of reasons.  
A person might sell his car quickly because he has urgent medical expenses.  A mutual 5 
 
fund might sell securities because it faces capital withdrawals by its shareholders (Coval 
and Stafford, 2007).  A firm might quickly sell a division to pay a regulatory fine.   
However, the most common mechanism that precipitates forced sales of both real and 
financial assets is collateralized lending.  In such lending agreements, collateral is a 
borrower’s pledge of specific property to a lender to secure repayment of a loan.  If the 
borrower defaults on a loan, the borrower forfeits to the lender the property pledged as 
collateral—sometimes automatically and sometimes through a legal process.  Most debt 
contracts, including mortgages and corporate debt, are collateralized.  When the borrower 
fails to either repay or meet some conditions of the loan, the lender has the right to sell 
collateral, and might wish for various reasons to do this quickly.    
Despite the importance of collateralized lending in the world, the traditional 
model of corporate finance of Modigliani and Miller (1958) has no role for collateral in 
supporting debt contracts.  In that model, debt is simply a promise of a part of cash flows 
of the firm.   Even second-generation corporate finance models emphasizing asymmetric 
information, such as Myers and Majluf (1984), leave no room for collateral.  These 
models thus fail to capture what can in situations of financial distress become the central 
feature of debt contracts.  
Models of debt contracts supported by collateral began to appear in corporate 
finance in the late 1980s, as the field shifted its attention from describing securities in 
terms of their cash flows to emphasizing their voting and other control rights (Grossman 
and Hart, 1988; Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Hart, 1995).  In an early paper along these 
lines, Townsend (1979) models debt as a contract that gives the lender the right to 
investigate the borrower and then seize its cash flows if the borrower defaults on its debt.   6 
 
In this costly state verification model, control over the cash flows shifts from the 
borrower to the lender after default.  More natural models of collateralized debt were 
proposed in the late 1980s by Hart and Moore (1994, 1995, 1998).   In their models, the 
lender has the explicit legal right to seize and liquidate collateral in the event of a default.  
The threat of liquidation provides an incentive for the borrower to repay. 
In these models, the liquidation value of collateral is taken as exogenous.   
Although liquidation value can be low for a highly idiosyncratic asset with no alternative 
use (Williamson, 1988), there is no reason in these models why liquidation value should 
be especially low for a generic asset such as a commercial airplane or a financial security.  
For such assets, the most plausible reason why specialists are not buying is that they 
themselves are financially constrained.  This might happen, for example, when all the 
industry specialists suffer the same adverse industry-wide or market-wide shock, and so 
are distressed, and selling assets, at the same time.  The constraints facing industry 
specialists are the second essential feature of fire sales.  An asset fire sale is thus a forced 
sale in which high-valuation bidders are sidelined, often due to debt overhang problems 
afflicting many specialists simultaneously (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992).    
To describe this situation, we used a version of a model in Hart (1993) and Hart 
and Moore (1995).  An entrepreneur borrows some money from a lender to buy an asset, 
such as an airplane, used to generate cash flows.  The optimal contract is a combination 
of short-term and long-term senior debt collateralized by the asset, the former used to 
force liquidation when the project turns out to be bad, the latter used to provide debt 
overhang that prevents the borrower from borrowing more and wasting money.  If the 
project is bad, the optimal contract calls for the sale of the asset. Unlike Hart and Moore, 7 
 
we considered liquidation as a sale of the asset in a market in which there is a potential 
high-valuation industry specialist who values the asset a lot, but also low-valuation 
outsiders, who are not expert at using the asset and hence have lower valuations.   For 
example, if the asset is a plane, and the seller is an airline, the high-valuation industry 
specialists would be other airlines.  In this case, low-valuation outsiders might be 
financial buyers, who would buy planes to lease them to other airlines.     
The key observation is that the specialist industry buyer, who would be the natural 
candidate for buying the assets, might itself be financially encumbered, and hence unable 
to bid, at precisely the time when the assets are being liquidated.  This would happen, for 
example, if liquidation is prompted by an industry-wide adverse shock.  In the case of 
airplanes, consider a decline in travel caused by higher perceived terrorism risk, which 
creates cash shortages and external financing problems for nearly all airlines.  If industry 
specialists do not have, and cannot raise, external funds to bid, the asset in liquidation 
will need to be acquired by an industry outsider at a lower price than value in best use.   
The specialists are sidelined.  Financially constrained industry buyers have become 
central to many models, and have been variously referred to as specialists, natural buyers, 
optimists, and farmers, as we discuss below.  
This analysis raises a number of questions.  Why don’t the lender and the 
borrower renegotiate, rather than have the lender repossess the asset?  Why doesn’t the 
lender, once it has repossessed the asset, hold on to it until market conditions improve?  
Presumably, it is in everyone’s interest to avoid a fire sale.  As we discuss below, 
substantial efforts are often made by market participants to avoid fire sales, by means of 
both how contracts are structured before the default and finding new financing rather than 8 
 
repossessing the asset after the default.  The Coase theorem is hard at work.  But such 
solutions are not always possible.  Borrowers often do not have the cash needed to avoid 
a fire sale, and cannot raise additional funds because (as in the Hart–Moore optimal 
financial structure) they face overhang from senior debt.   When negotiations do not 
succeed because additional cash flows cannot be pledged and a high-valuation buyer is 
not available, a fire sale is difficult to avoid.     
There are two related ideas in finance used to explain why some bidders do not 
bid, and hence the price falls below value in best use.  Grossman and Miller (1988) 
introduced the idea of slow-moving capital, arguing that sometimes it takes time for 
capital to come to the market, and in the meantime the price can deviate from 
fundamental value.  The authors had in mind a very short time period, perhaps a few 
minutes or hours, during which price pressure from a rapid sale would be felt.  This 
theory is a less-compelling account of price dislocations that last for months.   Allen and 
Gale (1994) stress the costs of market participation as the explanation for the absence of 
some buyers.  Allen and Gale’s theory is a good explanation for why only industry 
insiders, and not others, are present in the market at the time of the sale.   One still needs 
an explanation of why, in a fire sale, it is these insiders, and especially the insiders, who 
are sidelined.   
Our model of fire sales yields a notion of liquidity as the difference between 
market price and value in best use.  When market participants are financially 
unencumbered, liquidation brings prices close to value in best use, and markets are said 
to be liquid.  When, in contrast, market participants—and in particular specialists in using 9 
 
or holding the asset—are financially encumbered, liquidation leads to sale of assets to 
outsiders at lower prices, and markets are said to be illiquid.   
 
Evidence on Fire Sales of Real Assets 
  The theory of fire sales raises questions.  Do fire sales actually exist?  Do they 
have significant effects on prices?  Do firms take actions to avoid them?  Do the terms of 
collateralized loan contracts reflect the risk o f  f i r e  s a l e s ?   A r e bankruptcy regimes 
responsive to the risk of fire sales?   
The empirical research on fire sales of real assets began with Pulvino’s (1998) 
study of prices of used airplanes.  Commercial airplanes present a great advantage for the 
study of asset sales because the industry is heavily regulated, and as a consequence, an 
enormous amount is known about each airplane, so that it becomes possible to control for 
quality.  Pulvino compared the prices of planes sold by financially distressed airlines to 
those sold by the airlines that were not distressed, holding the exact characteristics of the 
planes constant.  He found that used planes sold by distressed airlines bring 10 to 20 
percent lower prices than planes sold by undistressed airlines.  Similar magnitudes appear 
in other studies.  For example, Campbell, Giglio, and Pathak  (forthcoming) report in a 
study of forced home sales that “foreclosure discounts are on average 27% of the value of 
the house.”  
  Other research shows that firms try to avoid such sales of assets in illiquid 
markets.  Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein (1994) find that, when industry conditions are 
bad, a debt work-out is more likely than a liquidation.  Schligemann, Stulz, and Walkling 
(2002) study divestitures of business units by U.S. firms, and find that firms are more 10 
 
likely to divest segments from industries with a more liquid market for corporate assets, 
even when this means keeping some of their worst-performing units.  Almeida, 
Campello, and Heckbarth (2009) show how poorly performing firms agree to be acquired 
by firms with substantial liquidity, even when there are no synergies in the merger, in 
order to avoid having to sell assets in illiquid markets.  These are clear efforts by firms 
and their lenders to avoid joint wealth loss in a fire sale.    
What about contractual adaptations to the risk of fire sales?   Benmelech and 
Bergman (2008) take advantage of the fact that, in the United States, the acquisition of 
airplanes by airlines is often financed by individual plane debt contracts.  They then 
consider what happens during renegotiation of debt contracts collateralized by airplanes.  
They find that airlines successfully renegotiate their lease obligations downward when 
their financial position is sufficiently poor and when the liquidation value of their fleet is 
low.  What determines an airline’s bargaining power is the ability of the lessors to lease 
the plane to its competitors, which falls when the industry is in distress.  Benmelech and 
Bergman (2009) find that airlines borrow on more attractive terms when airplanes used as 
collateral have less financially-encumbered buyers.  Benmelech and Bergman 
(forthcoming) show quite remarkably that the bankruptcy of an airline raises the cost of 
capital to its competitors who have similar airplanes.  Using a broader sample of 
industries, Ortiz-Molina and Phillips (2010) also find that firms in industries with more 
liquid assets (meaning more potential buyers), and during periods of high asset liquidity, 
face a lower cost of capital.  This evidence suggests that lenders to firms are aware of the 
costs of fire sales and structure debt contracts to take them into account.  11 
 
Fire sale considerations also play a role in the debate on the optimality of the two 
main choices in corporate bankruptcy: reorganization (Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy 
Code) or liquidation (Chapter 7).  Many economists and legal scholars favor Chapter 7 
liquidation, using the argument that auctions generally allocate resources to those who 
value them most (for example, Baird, 1986).  In our 1992 paper, we argued that this logic 
does not hold when high-valuation bidders in auctions are financially impaired.  Indeed, 
the standard case for Chapter 11 reorganization, while not focusing specifically on fire 
sales, warns about the risk of lost value arising through piecemeal liquidation of firms for 
prices substantially below the value in best use.  In countries that rely on Chapter 7-style 
liquidations, such as Sweden, the original lenders to firms finance the liquidation bids, 
often by the existing management, thus avoiding fire sales (Stromberg, 2000).     
Subsequent research on a cross-section of countries has confirmed that liquidation can be 
very costly.  In developed countries, in particular, liquidation leads to lower recovery 
rates for creditors than reorganization (Djankov, Hart, McLiesh, and Shleifer, 2008).  
The punch line of corporate finance research is that fire sales of real assets do 
exist, that they lead to substantial price discounts, and that firms and lenders are aware of 
these discounts and take them into account both before and after the onset of financial 
distress.  But there is limited drama in fire sales of real assets because firms, unlike 
financial institutions, do not exacerbate crises when they sell assets in fire sales.  Fire 
sales of financial assets raise new challenges. 
 
Fire Sales of Financial Assets 12 
 
Fire sales of securities have broader effects than fire sales of real assets because 
financial investors, such as hedge funds or banks, finance themselves with money that 
can be withdrawn quickly.   Demand deposits in banks are the standard example, but 
investors in mutual funds and hedge funds can also withdraw funds on short notice.   
Financial institutions are also typically heavily leveraged, and some of their loans are 
short-term, collateralized, or both.  Many banks fund their activities with commercial 
paper, which is a debt instrument with duration between a day and several months.  Such 
funding requires almost continuous renewal.  More recently, hedge funds and dealer 
banks financed some of their activities with repurchase agreements, which are extremely 
short-term loans collateralized by longer-term securities.  Adrian and Shin (2010) 
document high and growing leverage ratios of financial institutions, reaching debt-to-
equity ratios of 30 or more for dealer banks.  Much of this debt is short- term 
collateralized loans.   
The extreme vulnerability of financial investors to sudden stops in short-term 
financing can lead to cascades of liquidation.  When financial investors are forced to 
liquidate their holdings, security prices decline.  These declines, in turn, prompt further 
fund withdrawals and collateral calls for both these investors and their competitors.     
Such self-reinforcing fire sales were central in the recent financial crisis.  We begin by 
describing the relevant mechanisms, and then turn to crisis facts.  
In financial economics, the discussion of fire sales of financial assets is intimately 
related to an older idea of limited arbitrage, which is the central building block of models 
of market inefficiency and behavioral finance (Shleifer and Summers, 1990).   In the 
standard view of arbitrage, arbitrageurs lean against the wind to correct the mispricing of 13 
 
financial assets—and thus their influence is fundamentally stabilizing.   But might it be 
possible that arbitrageurs lose funds under management, and hence their ability to lean 
against the wind, at precisely the same time as prices move away from fundamental 
values and arbitrage opportunities improve?  Might arbitrageurs be more likely to exit 
their positions, rather than doubling up, when prices are most wrong?  Might they sell 
assets in a fire sale? 
In Shleifer and Vishny (1997), we connected the ideas of limited arbitrage and fire 
sales in a model of arbitrageurs, such as hedge funds, who experience capital withdrawals 
when their performance is poor.   Consider an arbitrageur that raises funds from outside 
investors and bets against a mispricing of a security which the arbitrageur knows for 
certain will disappear after some time.  Suppose, however, that this mispricing 
temporarily gets more extreme, and so the arbitrageur loses money.  Unfortunately for 
this arbitrageur, outside investors do not know whether the losses on these positions are 
due to a temporary deepening of mispricing, or rather to the errors in this arbitrageur’s 
strategies.  Absent such knowledge, the outside investors may choose to withdraw 
capital.  If they do so, the arbitrageur who is fully invested has to reduce its position and 
return capital to investors, even though holding on, or even adding to the holdings, is 
extremely attractive.   
But here comes the problem.  It is likely that the arbitrageur is not unique in 
following a particular strategy. When this arbitrageur and a number of the arbitrageur’s 
competitors who are doing the same thing all face fund withdrawals, they all start 
liquidating their positions, which only causes mispricing to widen further.  This is a fire 
sale of financial assets, but with an even deeper problem: As arbitrageurs liquidate their 14 
 
positions and mispricing widens, their losses grow, so that fire sales and the withdrawals 
of funds from arbitrage are self-reinforcing.  This feedback effect from growing 
mispricing to arbitrageur causes prices to spiral or cascade away from fundamental 
values.  This process can lead to a complete collapse of the market, or it can be arrested 
by the entrance of outsiders to support the market when prices fall far enough.  
Our 1997 model focused on the withdrawals of investor funds, but a similar and 
even stronger argument can be made if arbitrageurs finance their positions with debt.  In 
an important paper, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) develop a macroeconomic model of 
credit cycles driven by self-reinforcing changes in asset values and availability of 
collateralized loans.  In their model, there is a homogeneous asset called “land.”   They 
refer to high-valuation users of land as “farmers,” and to low-valuation users as 
“gatherers.”  Because farmers are the high-productivity users of land, they borrow as 
much as they can to invest, using their land holdings as collateral.  But suppose that an 
adverse shock hits farmers’ profits.  Now their net worth is not as high, and they cannot 
maintain as high a level of borrowing.   Because the farmers are levered up to the 
maximum, they have to liquidate some land.  But all the other farmers are also fully 
levered up, so the land must be sold to the less-productive gatherers who have some spare 
debt capacity but value the land less.  A fire sale occurs.   As land shifts to less-
productive gatherers, its fundamental value declines, which reduces its market value as 
collateral and precipitates further deleveraging and fire sales of land by farmers.  The 
process only stops because gatherers face decreasing marginal productivity, so eventually 
land becomes so unproductive in their hands and cheap that farmers can afford to hold it.  
In this way, Kiyotaki and Moore obtain a feedback from the declining value of collateral 15 
 
to further deleveraging by high-valuation users, which results in a downward spiral in 
prices.    
Gromb and Vayanos (2002) present a related model of fire sales leading to 
widening mispricing in the context of financial arbitrage.  In their model, a widening of 
mispricing can lead to forced deleveraging by arbitrageurs due to a decline of collateral 
values, which in turns leads to further widening of mispricing.  Equity and credit 
withdrawals by financiers from arbitrageurs work in the same direction of causing a 
downward price spiral in the valuation of a mispriced asset.   
The workings of our 1997 model and the Gromb–Vayanos (2002) model were 
seen in the collapse of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998 (referred to in 
the Greenspan testimony mentioned at the start of this paper). LTCM was a heavily 
leveraged hedge fund that sustained some losses on its positions during the Russian 
government’s bond default in summer 1998.  These losses precipitated substantial calls 
for cash or more collateral by short-term lenders to LTCM, as well as fund withdrawals 
by its investors.  Unable to come up with cash, LTCM had to liquidate its positions in a 
fire sale, which caused enormous price dislocations and losses for other hedge funds, 
which then also had to liquidate.  The process was stopped before it could run its full 
destructive course by a takeover of LTCM by a consortium of financial institutions, 
organized by the New York Federal Reserve to “avoid a fire sale liquidation of LTCM’s 
positions” (Edwards, 1999).   
An important feature of debt contracts collateralized by securities is time-varying 
margins often called “haircuts.”  To protect themselves from default, lenders require 
borrowers to post a margin, which means that they lend less than 100 percent of the price 16 
 
of the collateral.  If the market price of collateral falls, lenders require either more 
collateral or some cash back, which the borrower has to come up with to avoid having the 
collateral liquidated by the lender.  This mechanism can precipitate a fire sale in two 
distinct ways.  First, as the value of collateral declines, the borrower might be unable to 
come up with the cash to maintain its loan, and hence the collateral will be liquidated.  
Second, the margins or haircuts are determined endogenously (Geanakoplos, 2003).  A 
negative shock to collateral can lead to increased price volatility (or alternatively 
increased disagreement among investors), and thus increased equilibrium margins and 
haircuts imposed by lenders keen to protect themselves against losses.  If that happens, 
the borrower must come up with still more collateral, or return some cash.  This is again 
extremely destabilizing, since increases in margins force traders to reduce their positions, 
which can in turn further deepen mispricing.     
Several of the mechanisms just described are analyzed together by Brunnermeier 
and Pedersen (2009), who model the simultaneous determination of security prices and 
margins.  In their model, as security prices fall, margins or haircuts required to borrow 
using these assets as collateral rise because by assumption volatility increases.   They 
refer to this phenomenon as a decline in “funding liquidity.”  Unable to meet margin 
calls, arbitrageurs are forced to sell their securities in a fire sale, making markets illiquid 
in the sense of prices diverging from values.  They refer to this as “market liquidity,” 
similar to the sense of our 1992 paper.  The two spirals described by Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen reinforce each other: as prices fall, margins rise, arbitrageurs sell, and prices fall 
further, leading to a collapse of both prices and liquidity in a market.     17 
 
Even before the financial crisis, considerable empirical work documented the 
significance of limited arbitrage as related to fire sales in permitting deviations of prices 
from fundamental values.   We describe two strands of this research.  The first concerns 
failures of arbitrage directly.  Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino (2007), for example, study 
merger arbitrage during the crash of 1987 and convertible bond arbitrage in 2005, a time 
when the convertible bond market imploded following investor withdrawal of equity 
capital from money-losing hedge funds.  They show quite directly the self-reinforcing 
effects of arbitrageur losses, equity withdrawals, and liquidation of positions, which in 
turn lead to further losses. Mitchell and Pulvino (2010) present an even more striking 
study of arbitrage failures during the current financial crisis.  The authors look at a range 
of very common arbitrage strategies involving corporate securities, such as convertible 
debt arbitrage, credit default swap–corporate debt arbitrage, and several others.  They 
show that in the worst months of the crisis during 2008, arbitrage spreads—differences in 
the prices of nearly identical securities—reached fantastic levels.   For example, 
convertible debentures normally included in arbitrage trades, and typically mispriced by 
less than 2 percent, sold at a 10 percent discount.   
A second line of research, initiated by Coval and Stafford (2007), focuses on the 
behavior of mutual funds.  These funds are forced to sell securities immediately in 
response to withdrawals by their investors.  Coval and Stafford point out that by focusing 
on portfolios of stocks that mutual funds hold at the beginning of the quarter, and 
knowing their returns during the quarter (since mutual funds report net asset values 
continuously), one can predict roughly which stocks will be sold when investors liquidate 
their holdings of poorly performing funds at the end of the quarter.  This approach turns 18 
 
out to successfully predict future negative returns on the stocks held by poorly 
performing funds, and has been used in other studies (Dong, 2010; Ellul, Jotikasthira, and 
Lundblad, 2010; Greenwood and Thesmar, 2009; Jotikasthira, Lundblad, and Ramodarai, 
2010).  
 
Fire Sales and the Financial Crisis  
  To illuminate the significance of fire sales in the recent financial crisis, we start 
with a generally accepted narrative of the crisis, as summarized in Table 1.   We sketch 
only the most basic outline; more detailed accounts are contained in Brunnermeier 
(2009), Gorton and Metrick (2010), and Pozsar, Adrian, Ashcraft, and Boesky (2010).  
The financial crisis was most proximately related to the bubble in the housing market and 
to the financing of this bubble with mortgage-backed securities.  These mortgage-backed 
securities were created by pooling together portfolios of mortgages and then separating 
them into tranches such that the most senior tranches were perceived to be virtually safe 
and rated AAA by credit rating agencies (Coval, Jurek, and Stafford, 2009).  Because of 
this high rating, senior tranches of mortgage-backed securities ended up in the portfolios 
of institutional investors such as pension funds and insurance companies, but also as 
highly leveraged investments on the balance sheets of hedge funds, dealer banks, 
commercial banks, and special investment vehicles guaranteed by these banks.   
There remains a controversy as to why dealer banks were so exposed to mortgage-
backed securities.  Some of their holdings were surely explained by inventory and other 
market-making considerations, but some banks were perhaps speculating on the spreads  19 
 
Table 1 
A Narrative of the Financial Crisis 
 
1.  A housing bubble inflates in the mid 2000s. Homes are financed by mortgages 
that are increasingly securitized. Although the quality of mortgages deteriorates, 
the securities into which these mortgages are packaged are perceived to be safe 
and receive AAA-ratings.    
2.  Financial institutions such as banks and dealer banks retain substantial exposure 
to the real estate market through direct holdings of commercial real estate and 
direct holdings of mortgage-backed securities, but also through implicit 
guarantees of special investment vehicles they organize that hold mortgage-
backed securities and finance them with commercial paper.  
3.  Bad news about the housing market in the summer of 2007 surprises investors in 
AAA-rated mortgage-backed securities and precipitates a sequence of substantial 
disruptions in financial markets, such as the collapse of the asset-backed 
commercial paper market. Aggressive liquidity interventions from the Federal 
Reserve, including lending to market participants against risky collateral, stabilize 
markets through the summer of 2008 despite continued bad news about housing.  
4.  In September 2008, several events, including a run on money market funds, 
nationalization of AIG, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac, and particularly the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers, precipitate a massive financial crisis. Banks’ 
balance sheets contract because of massive losses on assets and withdrawal of 
short-term financing, which prompts banks to liquidate assets in fire sales. The 
consequences of fire sales are exacerbated by uncertainty about bank solvency 
and government policy.  
5.  In response to their losses and to reduced availability of financing, banks cut 
lending to firms. 
6.   The economy slides into a major recession.  
7.  Starting in October 2008, the government begins massive interventions in 
financial markets, including equity injections in banks, expansion of lending 
against risky collateral, but also direct purchases of long-term agency bonds, 
which sharply reduce the supply of risky bonds in the market.   The combination 
of government interventions eventually stabilizes the financial markets by spring 
2009, although the real economy remains sluggish.       
  20 
 
between returns on mortgage-backed securities and the cost of funding these positions 
with commercial paper and repurchase agreements (Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez 2010; 
Gorton and Metrick 2010).   It also seems likely that many market participants, including 
the rating agencies themselves, did not understand the risks of mortgage-backed 
securities  (Jarrow, Li, Mesler, and van Deventer, 2007; Coval, Jurek, and Stafford, 2009; 
Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny, forthcoming).  Whatever the true reasons for investor 
confidence in mortgage-backed securities, the result was that the high-valuation buyers of 
mortgage-backed securities (and similar asset-backed securities), such as hedge funds and 
financial institutions, financed some of their holdings with collateralized short-term debt.   
  As the grim news about the housing market and the safety of AAA-rated 
securities started to unfurl in 2007, investors in AAA-rated mortgage-backed securities, 
like many others, were caught by surprise.  Some of the short-term funding arrangements, 
such as asset-backed commercial paper, evaporated.   The Federal Reserve intervened 
starting in the summer of 2007 by facilitating mergers of troubled financial institutions 
and lending to others against risky collateral.   This series of interventions successfully 
delayed a major crisis by over a year.  
In September 2008, however, as bad news about the housing market and the 
values of mortgage-backed securities continued to pour in, markets collapsed.  The 
immediate impetus for the collapse was some combination of the run on money market 
funds investing in the commercial paper of banks, virtual nationalization of the AIG 
insurance company as well of government-sponsored housing enterprises Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, and most importantly the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers investment bank.   
As these events rolled out in quick succession, many forms of short-term financing, such 21 
 
as commercial paper and repurchase agreements, dried up, forcing banks to shrink their 
balance sheets.   Banks also had to improve the quality of their assets for regulatory 
purposes, forcing them out of previously safe but now risky securities.   To accomplish 
this, banks sold assets in a market where other banks and financial institutions were 
themselves liquidating their holdings, resulting in massive price declines and dislocations 
(Adrian and Shin, 2010).  We saw a classic cycle of price collapses and deleveraging 
described by fire sales models, driven by both capital withdrawals because of declining 
collateral values and growing haircuts because of increased risk.   
In fall 2008, the price of risk rose to unprecedented levels, and financial markets 
plummeted.   But why were the events after September 2008 so much worse than those 
before?  After all, bad news about housing and AAA-rated mortgage-backed securities 
started arriving in the summer of 2007, and dramatic events, such as the drying up of the 
asset-backed commercial paper market, started then.  In our view, after the Lehman 
bankruptcy a much larger proportion of specialist investors were sidelined from bidding 
for securities than in 2007 or early 2008.  Banks sustained massive losses and could not 
easily borrow to buy assets.  The contraction of commercial paper and repo markets 
eliminated short-term funding that financed the holdings of dealer banks (Adrian and 
Shin, 2010; Gorton and Metrick, 2010).  Hedge funds as well sustained major losses and, 
if anything, were liquidating their holdings because of investor redemptions and 
withdrawal of prime broker financing.  Before the Lehman bankruptcy, in contrast, 
liquidity provision by the Federal Reserve kept most of the specialist buyers in the 
market.  With natural buyers of distressed securities sidelined after Lehman, security 
prices went into a free fall.       22 
 
The Federal Reserve began to intervene in markets almost immediately after 
Lehman, injecting equity into commercial banks, expanding lending to financial 
institutions against risky collateral, guaranteeing the commercial paper markets, and 
eventually buying hundreds of billions of dollars of risky securities, mostly bonds of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.   Essentially, the Federal Reserve became the high-
valuation holder of risky securities.  Between accepting risky collateral as a guarantee for 
loans on advantageous terms, and removing massive quantities of securities from the 
market, the Federal Reserve stabilized banks and the financial system by spring 2009.   
The price of risk fell.  The economy remained sluggish, but a depression was avoided.  
Importantly, the fundamentals of the economy were probably worse in spring 2009 than 
earlier; the fact that financial markets stabilized quickly suggests that liquidity problems 
caused by fire sales were indeed severe after Lehman, and had to be addressed through 
public interventions.  The financial crisis appears to have been a liquidity crisis, not just a 
solvency crisis.   
   The fire-sales mechanism unifies several aspects of the propagation of the crisis.  
It explains how hedge funds, dealer banks, and commercial banks suffered huge financial 
losses, largely from reductions in the value of their security holdings.  It sheds light on 
massive violations of arbitrage conditions as hedge funds lost their financing (Mitchell 
and Pulvino, 2010; Krishnamurthy, 2010; Garleanu and Pedersen, 2010).  And it explains 
why investors most reliant on short-term financing were particularly exposed, and pulled 
back the most.   The common theme in all these phenomena is the sidelining of natural 
buyers of distressed securities, contributing to the near-shutdown of key parts of the 
financial system.  23 
 
  
Fire Sales in Macroeconomic Models 
How did fire sales and deterioration of balance sheets of banks lead to a broader 
economic crisis?  How did government policy stabilize the market? In this section and 
next, we argue that the fire-sales perspective can shed light on these questions as well.  
The idea that asset liquidations can have adverse consequences for real activity 
has been present in the macroeconomics literature at least since the 1930s.  In his debt 
deflation theory, Fisher (1933) argues that an adverse shock to the value of corporate 
assets forces firms to sell those assets to meet their debt obligation, and that such asset 
sales lead to declines in output prices.  The resulting deflation raises the real value of debt 
denominated in nominal terms and forces further liquidations, leading to a vicious debt 
deflation cycle.  Although the theory is not entirely transparent, Fisher offers some 
impressive data consistent with the story.   
For a more modern analysis, we need to explain why fire sales of financial assets 
such as bonds would entail real consequences.  Why would pecuniary effects from 
mispricing not only transfer wealth from sellers to buyers of securities but also 
undermine physical capital investment?  The financial crisis saw the decline of bank 
lending to firms and of real investment (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010; Campello, 
Graham, and Harvey; 2010, Kahle and Stulz, 2010).   What can explain it? 
Bernanke and Gertler (1989) argued that shocks to corporate net worth reduce the 
ability of firms to post collateral and borrow, and as such undermine corporate real 
investment.  The Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) paper, in addition to modeling price spirals 
due to deleveraging and fire sales of land by farms, shows that, as land values decline, so 24 
 
does the net worth of farms and their investment.  In the crisis, a sharp decline in asset 
values was inevitable as the housing bubble burst, but fire sales have worsened these 
declines. 
Most attention in the analysis of the crisis has however focused on the declines in 
balance sheets of banks.  Such declines would reduce bank-financed investment through 
the so-called bank lending channel (Bernanke and Blinder, 1988).   As a bank’s net worth 
declines, so does its ability to extend credit.   Research establishing the importance of the 
lending channel is voluminous; Kashyap and Stein’s (2000) is among the most 
convincing papers.  Stein (2010) explains how the bank lending channel can account for 
investment reductions during the crisis.   
There are two additional ideas of how fire sales of securities and the reductions in 
the net worth of banks can undermine investment.  Price dislocations resulting from fire 
sales influence bank decisions about whether to lend to real investment projects, to hold 
cash, or to pursue other financial investments.   Fire sales may increase the attractiveness 
of the alternatives to financing real investment.   
One key alternative is for a bank to hold cash and “keep its powder dry” because 
it might need cash in the future.  The idea that banks might want to hoard liquidity has 
been around for awhile, going back to Keynes’ description of “liquidity preference” as an 
alternative to real investment.  In the context of asset fire sales, in Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997), we discuss “the hold back effect,” whereby financial investors might hoard cash 
if the possibility of deepening mispricing and improving arbitrage opportunities seems 
likely.   Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) describe liquidity hoarding as a precaution firms or 
banks use against future liquidity needs.  Caballero and Simsek (2010) present an 25 
 
argument for cash hoarding when banks face uncertainty about the solvency of other 
banks they are dealing with.  Several recent papers have looked at these issues in fire-
sales models, emphasizing macroeconomic consequences of cash hoarding (Acharya, 
Shin, and Yorulmazer, forthcoming; Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2010; Diamond and 
Rajan, 2010).   Consistent with these studies, there is compelling evidence that banks 
sharply increased their holdings of cash and deposits with the Federal Reserve in 2009, 
presumably at the expense of lending (He, Kang, and Krishanmurthy, 2010).  
In Shleifer and Vishny (2010a), we alternatively argue that real investment must 
compete with investment in financial assets when bank capital is scarce.  We start with 
the observation that fire sales of assets by deleveraging financial institutions, such as 
banks, drive the prices of those assets below fundamental values. If price dislocation is 
extreme enough, banks will choose to invest in underpriced assets rather than lend money 
to firms, and real investment will suffer.  The evidence presented by He, Kang, and 
Krishnamurthy (2010) and Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) is consistent with the 
prediction that banks have used spare balance sheet capacity, including capital injections 
from the government, to buy securities rather than to lend in the wake of the financial 
crisis.    
The mechanisms we have described focus on the social costs of fire sales after 
they have occurred.   But presumably if market participants consider the possibility of 
fire sales before they arise, the conditions of borrowing and lending should reflect the 
risks of fire sales.  In this situation, there might be no social losses from pecuniary 
externalities, and no over-borrowing relative to the social optimum.  Several studies have 
however argued that this is not so.   Lorenzoni (2008) shows that when firms ignore the 26 
 
effect of fire sales on other firms, the level of borrowing need not be socially efficient.  
Stein (2010) begins with the crucial observation that, prior to the crisis, many of the 
securitized mortgages were essentially transformed by financial intermediaries into 
shorter-term securities, such as commercial paper, that were subsequently sold to 
investors.  In his model, this demand from money market funds for safe short-term assets  
drove the securitization process and made it profitable.  Stein then shows that, because 
the consequences of fire sales of securities are not fully internalized by banks, the 
creation of short-term assets was excessive from the social point of view.   
  An alternative approach to explaining why leverage is socially excessive is to 
drop the assumption of rational expectations.   In Shleifer and Vishny (2010a), we focus 
on investor optimism in the securitized loan market as a precursor of a crisis.   As banks 
make and securitize loans to cater to investor demand, the incentives of even fully 
rational banks lead to overexpansion of lending and excessive leverage in good times, but 
then fire sales and credit crunches in bad times.  Such credit crunches create real 
efficiency losses when good investment projects are not financed.    
  In Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (forthcoming), we also dispense with rational 
expectations, but argue alternatively that during the period of growing home prices and 
securitization, market participants neglected the risk that home prices could collapse, 
leading to defaults even on AAA-rated securities.   We show that this neglect of small 
risks could have led to the massive assumption of such risks by risk-averse investors, 
who then fled to safety when they became aware of the risks they were bearing.   
  The punch line of this analysis is that the sidelining of natural buyers in fire sales 
can lead to declines in asset prices and the net worth of financial institutions, which in 27 
 
turn trigger cuts in lending.  Fear of future fire sales likewise encourages financial 
institutions to hoard cash rather than finance investment.   The fire-sales mechanism thus 
entails real, and not just financial, consequences.   
 
 Policy Implications  
Economic theory suggests the possibility of efficiency losses from fire sales.   
Before the event, banks might expand their balance sheets excessively if they or investors 
make mistakes or if they fail to take into account the social cost of fire sales.   After the 
event, fire sales undermine the ability of financial institutions and firms to lend and to 
borrow by reducing their net worth. The presence of externalities provides a justification 
for policy interventions.  
Some policies aim to reduce the chances of a fire-sale scenario arising.  Examples 
of such policies include increases in the capital cushions of financial firms and 
improvements in the plumbing of the financial system (French et al., 2010; Hanson, 
Kashyap, and Stein, in this issue).    Likewise, policies such as mandating higher haircuts 
and margins in derivative markets aim to stop the cycle of deleveraging and fire sales 
before it starts. 
Here, we focus on policies that seek to contain and limit the effects of fire sales 
that are already underway.  When the government reacts to a fire sale in progress, what 
should it be seeking to accomplish, and what type of intervention is most likely to be 
beneficial? During fire sales, many key financial institutions such as banks are sidelined 
due to their inability to access capital. In this setting, two distinct ways to increase bank 
lending and real investment have been proposed: 1) the government can lend to banks 28 
 
against risky collateral; 2) the government can purchase assets directly or provide 
subsidies targeted at the purchasers of certain assets.   
The relative merits of these two types of interventions have been addressed, albeit 
briefly, in the recent literature.  Diamond and Rajan (2010) support liquidity injections 
into the banking system over government asset purchases on the grounds that the 
government is not able to judge whether asset prices are truly dislocated.  Conversely, 
they argue that misguided government purchases could distort asset prices in other 
directions and even result in losses. On the other side, in Shleifer and Vishny (2010b), we 
argue that liquidity injections into the banking system may not increase asset prices or 
lead to new lending to firms.  Instead, banks may engage in precautionary hoarding of 
liquidity or may purchase assets but still leave their prices well below the level at which 
new lending becomes attractive. A further problem with providing loans or equity to 
banks is that the government may end up supporting institutions that ultimately fail and 
perhaps encourage some of the desperate intermediaries to gamble with government 
funds by taking on more risk.  Security purchases can address asset price dislocations 
directly, without providing extra subsidies to weak or irresponsible banks.   To avoid 
overpaying for assets, government purchases could target potentially less-toxic asset 
classes, with greater prospects of reviving new lending in the short run and a lower 
chance of government losses.   
The idea of the government buying financial assets may seem suspicious to a 
number of economists.  After all, most economists would not think of the government 
buying airplanes, even during a fire sale.  But buying financial assets during a fire-sale 
crisis is very different from buying airplanes.  First, financial markets have more 29 
 
systemic implications for the rest of the economy than markets for used airplanes.   
Restoring the balance sheets of banks would unlock the lending channel in a way that 
restoring the balance sheets of airlines would not.  Second, the government would be a 
terrible owner of airplanes, unable to negotiate leases nearly as efficiently as the private 
sector.  In contrast, the Federal Reserve might be a reasonably efficient owner of certain 
fixed-income securities, especially if it can mostly avoid buying “lemons” by purchasing 
the relatively safe ones.     
How does the Federal Reserve know that some securities are cheap, rather than 
reflecting a high risk of insolvency of underlying issuers?  Of course, it can never know 
for sure, but in the aftermath of the Lehman bankruptcy in September 2008, there were 
many striking indications that illiquidity was a problem.  For example, 10-year 
government agency bonds that the Fed ended up buying were yielding up to 170 basis 
points more than similar duration Treasury bonds.  This compares to a normal spread on 
agency paper of 10 to 30 basis points.   In many other markets, wide credit spreads for the 
highest quality borrowers pointed to illiquidity rather than fundamental problems.  Even 
setting credit spreads aside, the Federal Reserve witnessed the near implosions of 
commercial paper and repo markets, effectively sidelining natural buyers who relied on 
these markets to finance purchases of risky debt.   This too seems to point to fire sales 
and illiquidity rather than pure solvency problems.   
U.S. government policies in response to the financial crisis and to fire sales in 
particular took various forms. The government bailed out some financial institutions, but 
also lent money against risky collateral and bought some assets.   Prior to the Lehman 
bankruptcy in September 2008, liquidity provision to financial institutions was the 30 
 
dominant strategy; in 2009, purchases of agency debt became important.  We do not 
know which one of these strategies was ultimately effective in arresting the crisis in 
spring 2009, although it does appear that pure liquidity injections and rescues of 
institutions in 2008 were insufficient to stop the slide.  Federal Reserve Chairman 
Bernanke (2009) described the Fed policy of credit easing in winter 2009, and his 
justifications seem to largely correspond to the analysis of fire sales presented here.  In 
Shleifer and Vishny (2010b), we describe the virtuous circle and the multipliers that arise 
from government security purchases as market liquidity improves.    
What emerges most clearly from the fire-sales models is the complementarity 
between tough preventive policies to reduce the risk of fire sales and soft policies when a 
fire sale and financial crisis is underway.   The basic prescription of these models is for 
the government to intervene in markets to stop fire sales quickly, because failure to do so 
can severely harm the financial system and the economy as a whole.  Although the choice 
is a controversial one, we think there is a case for the government supporting purchases 
of dislocated securities by market participants, or even buying them directly, rather than 
supporting weak or poorly run financial institutions.   But this type of softness in the face 
of an actual crisis works best when combined with safeguards that minimize the chance 
that the banking system becomes engulfed in fire sales.  31 
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